Abstract-The wide integration of gas-fired units and implementation of power-to-gas technologies bring increasing interdependence among the natural gas and electricity infrastructures. This paper studies the equilibrium of the coupled gas and electricity markets, which is driven by the strategic offering behaviors: each producer endeavours to maximize its own profit by taking the market clearing process into consideration. The market equilibrium can be obtained from an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. A special diagonalization algorithm is devised, in which the unilateral equilibrium of the gas or electricity market is found in the inner loop given the rivals' strategies; the interactions of the two markets are tackled in the outer loop. Case studies on two test systems validate the proposed methodology.
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I. INTRODUCTION
O VER the past decades, due to their high efficiencies and low carbon emissions, there has been widely utilization of the gas-fired units, enabling by the breakthroughs in the opencycle gas turbine (OCGT) and the combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technologies, as well as the dramatic decline in natural gas price brought by the shale rock revolution [1] . Meanwhile, resulting from the emerging power-to-gas (P2G) technology, excessive electricity can be used to produce gases, such as hydrogen and natural gas [2] , which can be stored in existing tanks in liquid or compressed morphology without intensive investments on upgrading the energy storage equipments. Such technologies greatly enhance the operational flexibility of power systems with volatile renewable energy integration. The potential bi-directional energy flows impose stronger interdependence between gas and power systems, which calls for interdisciplinary research on the system operation and design.
Along this line, extensive researches can be found on the topic of coordinated operation of power and gas systems. For example, the optimal gas-power flow (OGPF) is analyzed in [3] ; a stochastic unit commitment (UC) is proposed in [4] , which aims to mitigate the variability of wind generation; a robust scheduling model considering uncertain wind power and demand response is investigated in [5] . To absorb excessive wind power, P2G technologies are comprehensively introduced in [6] . From the marketing perspective, the interdependence mentioned above impacts upon both gas and electricity markets: on one hand, the prices of natural gas will influence the costs of gas-fired units as well as the gas demand of the electricity market; on the other hand, the prices of electricity will influence the costs of P2G facilities as well as the electricity demand of the gas market. Some inspiring works have been done to address the correlation between the electricity and gas markets. The day-ahead strategic offering behavior of one CCGT owner is discussed in [7] , taking operation constraints from both power and gas systems into consideration, giving rise to a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) formulation. The interaction of the power system and the gas system models under a market environment in a medium-long time horizon is analyzed in [8] .
In the pool-based market settings, the market pool is cleared by a market operator (MO) based on the offering strategies of all participants and necessary data. The market power of strategic electricity producers (SEPs) has been well explored in existing studies since the pioneer work [9] . The optimal offering strategy of a single SEP is analyzed in [10] , resulting in an MPCC formulation. The optimal offering strategies of multiple SEPs are discussed in [11] , leading to an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) formulation, and is solved by a stationary point method. The strategic behaviors of wind power producers are studied in [12] , where the resulting EPEC is solved by a diagonalization algorithm (DA). Similar to the pool-based electricity market, the gas pool can be cleared by a market operator as well. In this paper, we consider several energy producers who trade their resources strategically in the coupled electricity and gas markets. The strategic producers seek to maximize their own profits by their energy offers including prices and quantities, and the markets are required to reach an equilibrium. The major contributions are summarized as below.
1) A market mechanism that allows bi-directional energy trading between independently cleared electricity and natural gas markets is proposed. An EPEC model is established to study the optimal offering strategies and market powers of energy producers under the proposed market mechanism.
2) A specialized DA is designed to compute the market equilibrium, in which the inner level provides the equilibrium associated with one market while fixing the exogenous variables from the other; the outer level coordinates the offering strategies of energy producers in both markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic settings and market mechanism are elaborated in Section II. The EPEC formulation of the optimal offering problem in the coupled energy markets is presented in Section III. The diagonalization algorithm is introduced in Section IV. To validate the proposed models and algorithms, several numerical results on two test systems are shown in Sections V and VI. Finally, Section VII draws the conclusion.
II. MARKET SETTINGS
A. Pool-Based Market Mechanism
At the electricity side, SEPs, such as generation companies, receive locational marginal gas prices (LMGPs) from the gas market operator (GMO), and then offer their prices and quantities to the electricity market operator (EMO). The EMO clears the electricity market on principle of social welfare maximization, at the same time the locational marginal electricity prices (LMEPs) and the gas demand of each gas-fired unit can be obtained. At the gas side, strategic gas producers (SGPs) receive LMEPs from the EMO, and then offer their prices and quantities to the GMO. The GMO clears the gas market seeking for its corresponding maximum social welfare, and the LMGPs as well as the electricity demand of each P2G facility become clear. It is apparent that the electricity market and the gas market impact on each other through bi-directional gas-electricity transactions. The schematic diagram of the coupled energy markets is shown in Fig. 1 .
According to the reality of gas market operation [13] , there is no GMO that operates the gas market to obtain the maximum social welfare, especially in the U.S. Indeed, compared with the U.S. electricity markets, gas markets are much less competitive and flexible, which can be concluded from the following facts: 1) the natural gas spot market is a daily market and the price remains the same throughout a gas day [13] . 2) there are two main types of gas delivery services, i.e., the firm and the interruptible gas transportations, and the gas-fired units usually get the latter [14] . Under the current integration situation of energy systems, however, fuel inadequacy of the gas-fired units has been a significant problem for power systems. According to [15] , gas-fired units contribute to 25% of the total forced outage during the 2014 cold weather events in PJM electricity market as the result of natural gas interruption. Moreover, the proportion of gas demand used for power generation over the total gas consumption has reached 40% globally in 2012 and will keep increasing in the next years [16] , indicating a deepening interconnection between the power and gas systems, which may also lead to more severe fuel inadequacy issues in the power systems if the flexibility of the gas market remains the same. Therefore, the emergence of one market operating agency similar to EMO might be one of the future improvements of the gas market.
Remark 1: Another important issue is the asynchrony of the gas and electricity markets. According to [17] , none of the electricity markets is totally synchronized with its corresponding gas fuel market in the U.S. currently. Fig. 2 describes the asynchrony of midwest independent system operator (MISO) electricity market with its gas fuel market. From Fig. 2 , an interesting phenomenon can be observed that the gas-fired units have to purchase gas from two different gas days, say Gas Day 1 and Gas Day 2, if they would like to use firm power to participate in the electricity market of Electric Day 2. Obviously, the day-ahead market of Electric Day 2 is cleared before Gas Day 2 starts, which means the electricity market prices of Electric Day 2 may affect the behaviors of the gas producers in Gas Day 2. In recent years, lots of efforts have been made to synchronize the natural gas and electricity markets such as the adjustment of electricity day and gas day [17] and the two markets might be totally synchronized in the future. Moreover, the emerging bilateral energy trading may further promote the synchronization of the two markets.
B. Assumptions and Simplifications
The main assumptions made in the proposed models are summarized as follows. 1) General settings: i. the SEPs and SGPs charge the energy users at LMEPs and LMGPs, respectively. Meanwhile, upper bounds are imposed on the offering prices; ii. the demands in both markets are non-elastic. For detailed price-responsive load model, one can refer to [11] . The SEPs and SGPs explicitly anticipate the impact of their offers on the markets and the clearing results, which is done by the market clearing problem modeling. The rivals' data such as operating parameters as well as economic parameters, network parameters of the system and the load demands are known; iii. the electricity market and the gas market are cleared at the same time.
2) For the power network: i. the lossless direct current (DC) power flow model is adopted; ii. we assume the P2G facilities to be non-strategic; iii. we assume that UC decisions have been made in a previous stage. If a unit is shut down, its output is enforced at zero. Only dispatchable units (change over time) are considered. Interested readers can refer to [18] for the market clearing model considering UC decisions.
3) For the gas network: i. we use a simplified steady-state model, in which the linepack is neglected. Moreover, we assume the gas flows in pipelines are directly controllable and the gas nodal pressure variables are omitted, leading to a linear approximation which is also used in [8] , [19] , [20] . This simplification is reasonable when there are enough regulating devices; ii. we adopt the simplified compressor model in [21] . For detailed modeling of the compressor, please refer to [7] ; iii. we assume the gas storages to be non-strategic.
One limitation of the proposed model is about data privacy, which is related to the second assumption of the general settings. In existing strategic offering works based on EPEC approach [11] , [12] , [22] , they share the aforementioned assumption. However, data privacy is one of the most important features of current energy markets, which indicates the strategic offering equilibrium problem of energy systems in privacy-oriented case is still an open question.
Remark 2:
Recently, lots of works have been done about the interaction issues of the power and gas systems. The OGPF problem on transmission level has been well studied by [3] , [23] - [27] . The day-ahead co-scheduling problem has been addressed by [5] , [7] , [28] - [30] . [20] , [31] , [32] have discussed the gas-power co-planning problem. In terms of the gas system modeling, these aforementioned works can be roughly divided into the following four categories 1) Controllable-flow model: There are no nodal pressure variables and the gas flow in each pipeline is fully controllable with a maximum flow limit. Both nodal gas injections and gas flows are control variables. Nodal gas balance is required. It is almost the most simplified gas system model and is widely adopted in planning as well as economic analysis problems [20] , [31] . Considering the relatively slow gas dynamics as well as the long distances of gas pipelines, non-steady-state operating conditions are common in the gas systems. Thus it is reasonable to model the gas system dynamics, which is referred to as the linepack. Non-steady-state operation endows the gas systems with storage capability. The gas flow dynamics are formulated by a set of partial differential equations (PDEs) [33] . Linear discrete approximation is proposed in [29] , in which the OGPF problem is cast into an MILP. [26] and [27] use coarse approximations to make the PDEs tractable. 4) Noncontrollable-flow model with exact dynamics: As aforementioned, the actual gas system dynamics are formulated by a set of PDEs. [34] directly adopts the PDEs to depict gas flow dynamics and solves the OGPF problem using a nonlinear solver. This model is the most accurate one while the corresponding computational burden is the highest.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. EPEC Model for the Electricity Market
In the electricity market, all SEPs aim to maximize their corresponding individual profits, at the same time subjecting to the electricity market clearing problem, thus making it a bilevel optimization problem, which reads
, ∀t, ∀i, ∀s
In the above expressions, (1) constitutes the objective function of the upper level offering problem, while (2) and the lower level electricity market clearing problem, shown as (3)- (14), serve as its constraints. Specifically, (1) represents the negative of the profit of SEP s, where the first two components are the generation costs of non-gas-fired and gas-fired units, respectively, and the last component is the utility of all the units owned by SEP s. (2) imposes upper and lower bounds on the offering prices, as well as the monotonicity with respect to the energy block. Especially, Card implies the cardinality operator. It should be noted the monotonicity in the context refers to the generalized monotonicity, in other words, a monotonic increasing function can also be described as a non-decreasing one. The LMEPs β n p t and the energy contracts P s ibt are determined by (3)-(14). Objective (3) represents the negative of the social welfare, where the second component is the generation expenses of SEPs and the rest two components are the generation costs of gas-fired and non-gas-fired units owned by non-SEPs, respectively. Constraints (4) and (5) are the energy block capacity limitations of all types of units. Equation (6) depicts the nodal power balance constraints. (7) enforces the flow limits of transmission lines. (8) sets the phase angle of the reference node. (9)- (12) are the ramping requirements of units of SEPs and non-SEPs, respectively. (13) and (14) act as the minimum output requirements of units of SEPs and non-SEPs, respectively. Dual variables are indicated at the corresponding equations following a colon.
B. EPEC Model for the Gas Market
In the gas market, all SGPs aim to maximize their corresponding individual profits, at the same time subjecting to the gas market clearing problem, thus making it a bilevel optimization problem, which reads
In the above expressions, (15) is the objective of the upper level offering problem, while (16) and the lower level gas market clearing problem, demonstrated as (17)- (27) , serve as its constraints. Specifically, (15) represents the negative of the profit of SGP v, where the first component is the production cost and the second component is the utility of all the gas wells owned by SGP v. (16) restricts the upper and lower bounds of gas offering prices. The LMGPs n g and the gas contracts q v m are determined by (17)- (27) . Objective function (17) defines the negative of the social welfare, where the first two components are the generation expenses of SGPs and non-SGPs, respectively, and the third component is the electricity purchase costs of P2G facilities, and the last component is the cost for storing gas. Constraints (18) and (19) give the production limits of gas wells of SGPs and non-SGPs, respectively. In the natural gas network, pipelines without/with compressors are called passive/active pipelines. Gas flow capacities of passive and active pipelines are represented by (20) and (21), respectively. (22) indicates non-negative constraints on the electricity demands of P2G facilities. (23) and (24) depict the capacity limitations of gas storages. (25) and (26) impose the range of in and out rate of gas storages, respectively. (27) is the nodal gas balance constraints. Dual variables are indicated at the corresponding equations following a colon.
Remark 3: According to the reality of the current natural gas market, the LMGPs remain constant during a gas day. However, in the proposed gas market model, we adopt a real-time natural gas pricing mechanism. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that the proposed model can be in line with the current natural gas market mechanism after the following modifications.
1) Drop the subscript t in δ v m t , which indicates the offering prices of the SGPs remain the same during a gas day. 2) Add the nodal gas balance equations (27) together with respect to t, thus have the equation (28)
where the dual variable ρ n g acts as the LMGPs. With the aforementioned modifications, the LMGPs of the gas market will remain unchanged throughout a gas day. Remark 4: It should be noted the proposed gas system model (18) - (27) is a simplification of the actual gas systems, where the nodal gas pressures, the linepack and the Weymouth equations are omitted for the sake of computational tractability. Even though, the linepack, which can be regarded as a sort of gas storage, can provide additional operational flexibility for the gas systems and benefit both electricity and gas markets in terms of market clearing cost reduction, its quantitative description requires the inclusion of the nodal pressure variables as well as the nonlinear and non-convex Weymouth equations [29] , which would make the proposed model computationally intractable. Therefore, the aforementioned controllableflow model is adopted in the proposed gas system model. A computationally tractable formulation of the linepack in the gas market clearing problem is worth investigating and would be the future work of the authors.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present equivalent MPCC formulations for the bilevel offering problems associated with each strategic producer in the upper level. Then a specialized DA is introduced to solve the proposed EPEC models by iteratively solving a sequence of MPCCs, until certain convergence criteria are reached.
A. Solution Methodology for MPCCs
Take the electricity market as an example, for SEP s * , if the LMGPs, the electricity demands of P2G facilities as well as the offering strategies of the other SEPs are fixed, the unilateral optimal offering problem of SEP s * presented in (1)- (14) can be cast as the following MPCC, which can be obtained by replacing the lower level problem by its KKT optimality conditions
where, (30)-(51) are the KKT optimality conditions of the lower level electricity market clearing problem, the notation 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0 represents the complementarity and slackness conditions a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and ab = 0. Similarly, for SGP v * in the gas market, if the LMEPs, the gas demands of gas-fired units as well as the offering strategies of the other SGPs are fixed, the unilateral optimal offering problem of SGP v * presented in (15)- (27) can be cast as the following MPCC
where, (53)-(76) are the KKT optimality conditions of the lower level gas market clearing problem. There are two sorts of nonlinearities in the proposed MPCCs: one is the summation of bilinear terms (i∈φ i (n p ))bt β n p t P s * ibt in (29) and (m ∈ϕ m (n g )t) n g t q v * m t in (52), consisting of products of primal and dual variables; the other is the complementarity constraints, including (40)- (51) and (62) 
2) Complementarity Constraint: All complementarity constraints in KKT optimality conditions share the similar form of
where a, f, g represent the primal variable, constant and dual variable, respectively. By introducing a binary variable h and the following constraints, (79) can be fully linearized.
where BigM is a sufficient large positive number. After the linearization of objective functions and constraints, the MPCCs of the SEP and the SGP have been converted into mixed integer linear problems (MILPs), and are readily solvable by using commercial solvers, such as Cplex and Gurobi.
B. The Nested Diagonalization Algorithm
In this subsection, a nested diagonalization algorithm (NDA) is proposed to find the equilibrium of the coupled gas-electricity markets. For notation brevity, we use P s and G v to represent the strategic offering problems for SEP (s ∈ S) and SGP (v ∈ V ) in the MILP form, respectively. The aggregated problems {P s }, ∀s and {G v }, ∀v represent the EPECs of the electricity and gas markets, respectively. 1) Inner Level DA: Two inner level DAs are introduced to solve the EPEC models for the electricity and gas markets, respectively, the details are given below.
2) Outer Level DA: Similar to [35] , we adopt an iterativebased algorithm to find the equilibrium of the coupled energy markets, which is referred to as outer level DA. The details are given below.
Besides the proposed NDA, traditional diagonalization algorithm (TDA) is also a straightforward method to find the equilibrium of the gas-electricity markets. However, the TDA suffers much higher computational cost than the NDA, and even fails to solve the EPEC model sometimes. The reason is that the updating variables in the outer level of the NDA are already equilibria, namely equilibria in electricity and gas markets, respectively, while the updating variables in the TDA are not. It should be noted that either the proposed NDA or the TDA can find only one equilibrium depending on a given initial value, even though there may be multiple local equilibria in the EPEC model. A potential candidate which is able to locate multiple equilibria in the EPEC framework is suggested in [22] .
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this sequel, we present numerical experiments on a 6-bus power system with a 7-node gas system to show the effectiveness of the proposed models and algorithms. The experiments are performed on a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.2 GHz CPU and 4 GB memory. The proposed algorithms are implemented on MATLAB with YALMIP toolbox [36] . MILP is solved by Gurobi 6.5, the optimality gap is set as 0.1%. It has 4 gas-fired units (P 2 , P 4 , P 6 , P 7 ), 4 non-gas-fired units (P 1 , P 3 , P 5 , P 8 ), 6 gas wells (G 1 − G 6 ), 1 compressor, 1 gas storage (GS 1 ), 2 P2G facilities (P 2G 1 , P 2G 2 ), 4 power loads and 3 gas loads. Specifically, the head and tail nodes of the compressor are 4 and 2, respectively. The parameters of the hybrid test system can be found in [37] . The 24-period dayahead electricity and gas demands are shown in Fig. 4 . The total electricity and gas demands of period 1 are 525 MW and 5520 Sm 3 /h, respectively. The time scale of the market models in the following subsections are single-period unless stated otherwise, which means the ramping constraints (9)- (12) in the electricity market model and the gas storage constraints (23)- (26) in the gas market model become inactive. One can directly remove the aforementioned constraints as well as corresponding expressions to obtain a single-period coupled markets model. In the following cases, we have 4 SEPs, who own generators P 1 to P 4 , respectively, and the rest units are owned by a non-SEP. Also, we have 3 SGPs, who own gas wells G 1 to G 3 , respectively, and the rest gas wells are owned by a non-SGP. UC of this case has been decided and all the units are on along the scheduling horizon. in the proposed NDA is 1% and its maximum iteration number is 20.
A. Uncongested Network
The coupled energy markets and the equilibrium are firstly studied without considering congestions by neglecting the capacity constraints, including those of power transmission lines and gas pipelines. The clearing results of electricity and gas markets are listed in Table I . The outputs of generators and gas wells which are not shown in Table I are 0. In the power network, all the buses share the same LMEP, because the network is uncongested. The committed power of each block of generators can be obtained according to their capacity parameters. In the gas market, due to the existence of active pipeline as well as its radial topology, the LMGPs could be different at the head and the tail nodes of an active pipeline, which can be observed from Table I for this particular case. The energy exchange between the electricity and gas markets are also listed in Table I . Intuitively, due to the dissipativity of energy conversion, the gas prices of P2G facilities should be higher than the LMGPs in general, resulting in a zero power consumption of P2G facilities in the uncongested network. Offering strategies of the SEPs and SGPs are listed in Table II and Table III, respectively. In Table II and Table III , it can be observed that the offering prices of SEPs and SGPs are the same as the corresponding LMEPs and LMGPs, respectively, and the offering quantities are always no less than the market clearing results, which validate the effectiveness of the proposed models and algorithms.
Then we change the electricity and gas loads by their load ratios, respectively. The corresponding locational marginal prices are shown in Figs. 5 and 6 . Particularly, the LMGPs of nodes 4 and 7 of the gas network stay at 2.0 $/Sm 3 in all the cases. From Fig. 5 , it can be observed that the LMEPs are always nondecreasing with the gas load ratio (GLR) when electricity load ratio is fixed. However, the relationship between the LMEPs and electricity load ratio (ELR) is quite complicated, whose trend is increasing in general yet decreases occasionally, say there is a drop when ELR is 0.9, which is mainly caused by the competition in the electricity pool as the LMGPs remain the same when ELR varies from 0.8 to 1.0. Furthermore, from Fig. 6 , the LMGPs of two sides of active pipeline are different in most 
B. Congested Network
The analysis in the previous section is performed again with the transmission capacity limits imposed on both power transmission lines and gas pipelines. The corresponding transmission capacity parameters can be found in [37] . The results are listed in Table IV . The outputs of the generators and the gas wells which are not shown in Table IV are 0. In the gas market, the SGPs are endowed with the ability to offer higher prices due to congestion, which would increase the marginal cost of the gas-fired units. In the electricity market, the SEPs are able to offer higher prices owing to congestion as well as the increase of their marginal costs. Therefore, the offering prices of SEP 4, SGP 1 and SGP 3 all reach their upper bounds in the equilibrium. However, the EMO has to increase the outputs of the gas-fired generation assets because of congestion. Thus, the total gas consumption from the gas-fired units has an increment of 1733 Sm 3 /h compared with that in the uncongested case. Meanwhile, the traditional unit, say P 2 , is put into operation in this case while it is off in the uncongested case. It can be observed that the P2G facilities are not working as they are still not cost-effective according to the gas market clearing results. Offering strategies of the SEPs and the SGPs are listed in Tables V and VI, respectively. In Tables V and VI , similarly, the offering prices of the SEPs and the SGPs are the same as the corresponding LMEPs and LMGPs, respectively, in order to maximize their own profits. Moreover, the offering quantities are always no less than the market clearing results.
In terms of the social welfare, namely, the negative market clearing cost, the electricity market clearing cost in the congested case suffers a 5.205 × 10 3 $ increase compared with that in the uncongested case, which rises from 2.835 × 10 3 $ to 8.040 × 10 3 $. Meanwhile, the gas market clearing cost in the congested case increases by 2.287 × 10 3 $ compared with that in the uncongested case, which rises from 6.581 × 10 3 $ to 8.868 × 10 3 $.
C. Comparison With Sequential Clearing Mechanism
According to the day-ahead market schedule of ISO New England [17] , its electricity market is cleared at 3 PM EST and the corresponding gas fuel market is cleared at 4:30 PM EST. And as mentioned in Section II-A, gas-fired units usually get long-term and low-price contracts from gas markets. Furthermore, there are almost no P2G facilities in the current electricity markets. The clearing mechanism based on the current electricity and gas market settings is depicted by Fig. 7 . From Fig. 7 , the coupled markets are cleared by the following 4 steps. 1)
Step 1: generation companies sign gas delivery contracts with gas companies or refer to the existing contracts; 
2)
Step 2: generation companies offer their prices as well as quantities to the EMO, and then EMO clears the electricity market; 3)
Step 3: the SEPs calculate the gas demands of the gas-fired units according to the clearing results of the electricity market; 4) Step 4: natural gas companies offer their prices as well as quantities to the GMO, and then GMO clears the gas market. Next, comparisons are made between the market clearing results of the proposed market mechanism and the aforementioned sequential one. The test system is almost the same as Section V. A except that there are no P2G facilities in this case. Please refer to Fig. 3 and [37] for the topology and parameters, respectively. The capacity constraints, including power transmission lines and gas pipelines, are neglected for simplicity. According to Fig. 7 , different gas delivery contacts are set as input and the corresponding market clearing results are listed in Table VII . Particularly, in Table VII , EMCC, GCG and GMCC are short for electricity market clearing cost, gas consumption of the generators and gas market clearing cost, respectively. The service type liberalized refers to the proposed market mechanism in Section II-A.
Here, we use the term, gas average price (GAP), to help comparing the performances of the two different market mechanisms, which can be obtained by dividing the clearing cost of the gas market by the total outputs of the gas producers. The total outputs of the gas producers and the clearing cost of the gas market are 7.038 × 10
3 Sm 3 and 6.581 × 10 3 $, respectively, as shown in Tables I and VII . Thus the GAP in the uncongested case is 0.94$/Sm 3 . As shown in Table VII , when the given contract price is 0.6$/Sm 3 , or rather lower than GAP, the electricity market clearing saving is 41$ compared with the results of the proposed liberalized market, however, the gas market clearing cost increases by 6.889 × 10 3 $. Additionally, when the given contract price is 2.0$/Sm 3 , namely, higher than GAP, the electricity market clearing cost increases by 1.228 × 10 3 $, which is attributed to the exorbitant gas contract. Furthermore, the gas market clearing cost reduces by 411$, as the result of the gas consumption decrease. From the analysis above, we can learn that the sequential clearing mechanism is inappropriate, since it may increase the clearing costs of both markets, which needs to be upgraded further.
D. Results of Multi-Period Market Model
In what follows, the time scale of the market model is extended to 24 periods. And the transmission capacity limits of the power transmission lines and gas pipelines are imposed in this case. The LMEPs and LMGPs are presented in Figs. 8 and  9 , respectively. From Figs. 8 and 9 , a strong connection between LMEPs and LMGPs can be observed. In periods 9 to 11, 14 to 16 and 22, significant increments in LMGPs can be observed at nodes 1, 5 and 6. Simultaneously, similar increments can be found in LMEPs of nodes 1, 2, 3, indicating the interdependency of power and gas systems. Meanwhile, the stored gas amount 
TABLE VIII MARKET CLEARING COSTS WITH/WITHOUT GAS STORAGES
in GS 1 is shown in Fig. 10 , where the gas storage GS 1 , connected to gas node 2, supplies gas when the LMGPs of node 2 are relatively high, say periods 7 to 9 and periods 14 to 20, and stores gas when the LMGPs of node 2 are relatively low, say periods 2 to 6 and period 23. The clearing costs of the two markets with/without gas storages are listed in Table VIII , from which we can see that the clearing costs of the electricity and gas markets decrease by 31% and 67%, respectively, benefiting from the introduction of gas storages. This is because the gas market clearing cost would be reduced by strategic operation of gas storages and so do the LMGPs, thus decreasing the fuel costs of the gas-fired units and the electricity market clearing cost.
E. Comparisons with TDA
Next, comparisons are made between the computational efficiencies of the NDA and the TDA [12] . Both TDA and NDA are applied to the cases in Sections V-A and V-B. The mechanisms of NDA and TDA are given as below. In the inner level of NDA, the equilibrium of the electricity and gas markets can be obtained by solving a series of corresponding MPCCs, while the outer level of NDA coordinates the equilibrium of both markets. TDA treats the proposed strategic offering problem in the coupled markets as one integral series of MPCCs and coordinates the results of each MPCC sequentially. The results of computational efficiencies are listed in Table IX .
In Table IX , the term, number of MPCCs, represents the number of MPCCs solved by the algorithms to find an equilibrium, which is obviously related to the iteration number of the algo- rithms. Moreover, the computational time is directly related to the number of MPCCs solved during the iteration of the algorithms, as solving MPCCs contributes most to the computational burden of both algorithms. From Table IX , the proposed NDA outperforms TDA in both cases. Particularly, TDA fails to converge in a given iteration limit under the congested case. The reason is that the updating variables in the outer level of NDA already reach equilibrium, while the updating variables in TDA are not, which would decrease the algorithm efficiency. Additionally, the consideration of transmission capacity constraints in the congested case shrinks the feasible regions of MPCCs, which further increases the difficulty of searching equilibrium for TDA, leading to the non-convergent results.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this sequel, we present numerical experiments on a modified IEEE 118-bus power system with a modified Belgian highcalorific 20-node gas system to demonstrate the performance of the proposed models and algorithms, where the simulation environment is identical to that of Section V.
Topology of the test system can be found in [37] . It includes 30 gas-fired units (P 1 − P 30 ), 24 non-gas-fired units, 10 gas wells (G 1 − G 10 ), 3 compressors, 4 P2G facilities (P 2G 1 − P 2G 4 ), 2 gas storages (GS 1 − GS 2 ), 91 power loads and 9 gas loads. Please refer to [37] for the system data. Similarly, the time scale of the market models in the following cases are single-period unless stated otherwise. In the following cases, we have 3 SEPs and a non-SEP in the electricity market. Also, we have 4 SGPs and a non-SGP in the gas market. The ownership of generators as well as gas wells can be found in Table X . Likewise, UC of this case has been decided and all the units are on along the scheduling horizon. in the proposed DA is 1% and the maximum iteration number is 20. Particularly, the solution time limit of the NDA is set to be 7200 seconds. 
A. Simulation Results
We begin this case study with demonstrating the results of the offering equilibrium and the market clearing results of the coupled markets under uncongested and congested networks in Tables XI-XIII. From Table XI , it can be observed the offering prices of some specific generators are zero while both TABLE XV COMPUTATIONAL TIME UNDER DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF TIME PERIODS their offering quantities as well as clearing quantities are nonzero, or rather P 6 , P 8 , P 13 , P 15 in the uncongested case and P 6 , P 13 , P 17 in the congested case. The reason is that all those generators are not marginal ones for both networks. If the generator of an SEP is not the marginal one, it can offer arbitrary price to the EMO as long as the price is no higher than the LMEPs, which guarantees its clearing quantity to be non-zero. The equilibrium of SGPs and the gas market clearing results are listed in Table XII. In Table XII , though the offering prices of SGP 2, SGP 3 and SGP 5 are the same and their offering quantities are non-zero, only SGP 2 is required to supply gas by the GMO as the result of gas pipeline congestion. Meanwhile, the comparisons of market clearing costs in the uncongested and congested cases are shown in Table XIII , where the clearing cost increment of the electricity and gas markets are 9.73% and 9.19%, respectively, in the congested case compared with the uncongested case, which are not as significant as the cases in Section V. The reason lies in two aspects: i. the topology of both power and gas networks of the test system in this section are much more complex than the ones in Section V, which alleviates the congestion directly; ii. the interdependency of the networks becomes stronger, which offers more energy exchange choices for both networks and alleviates the congestion futher.
B. Computational Efficiency Analysis
In this subsection, the computational efficiency of the proposed models and algorithms is analyzed in terms of the num- tuple (a, b) , where a is the number of SGPs and b is the number of SEPs. The details of the ownership of the units and gas wells can be found in [37] . From Table XIV, the computational time does not monotonically increase with respect to the NSP. Furthermore, the solution time of multi-period market models is listed in Table XV , where the numbers of SEPs and SGPs are 3 and 4, respectively. From Table XV, significant solution time increment can be observed when the number of time periods increases in both uncongested and congested cases. Also, in the 24-period congested case, no acceptable solution is obtained in the given time limit.
Before addressing the scalability issue for large systems, we would like to analyze the computational burden of executing our algorithms for solving the proposed EPEC models. In each iteration of the proposed NDA, the inner level DA for the electricity and gas markets are both called once, where a sequence of MPCCs are solved. In Section IV, the nonlinear MPCCs are cast into MILPs with a huge number of Big-M constraints, which are constraints embedded with BigM . Intuitively, the computational burden of the MILPs is directly related to the number of binary variables as well as Big-M constraints. Based on the aforementioned analysis, we suggest to make the following assumptions and simplifications to ensure the performance of our work in practical engineering applications. 1) From the modeling aspect: i. the gas-fired units generally have better ramping capabilities than the non-gas-fired units, especially the coal-fired units. If the time interval is long enough, such as 1 hour, the ramping constraints of the gas-fired units might be omitted, which will significantly reduce the number of binary variables and Big-M constraints. ii. one can run the power transmission line congestion analysis in advance to identify and neglect the redundant transmission capacity constraints (7) [38] , which would reduce the number of binary variables and Big-M constraints as well. 2) From the algorithmic aspect: one can set different values for BigM to linearize the different types of complementarity constraints to avoid unnecessary computational burden in the branch and bound procedure [39] . These above assumptions and simplifications can effectively reduce the number of binary variables and Big-M constraints, which would decrease the computational burden of the proposed algorithms. However, large-scale systems are still challenging to solve. Under such circumstances, we can only have the final solution in the given time limit.
Particularly, the aforementioned modeling simplification techniques are applied to the congested case, the computational results are listed in Table XVI Table XVI , it can be observed that all the proposed modeling simplification techniques can reduce the computation time, where neglecting the ramping constraints of the gas-fired units is the most effective one. The reason is quite straightforward. Imagine a simplified case, where all the temporally coupled constraints, namely, the ramping constraints of both of the gas-fired and the non-gas-fired units in the electricity market as well as the operational constraints of the gas storages in the gas market, are neglected. Then each multi-period EPEC model can be divided into several single-period independent small-scale ones, which will significantly reduce the computational burden. The most simplified case enjoys 55% and 79% computational time reducing for 8 and 16 time periods, respectively. Futhermore, we can achieve a solution within the given time limit in the most simplified case when time periods are 24, which further validates the effectiveness of the proposed modeling simplification techniques. However, it should be noted that the solution obtained by solving the most simplified model is an approximate one.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the physical and economic interdependence between the natural gas and electricity systems becoming stronger, this paper proposes an EPEC model for the synchronized gas-electricity markets that allows bi-directional gas-power trading. An NDA is devised to compute the market equilibrium. Compared with the current sequential clearing mechanism, the proposed synchronized clearing mechanism can improve the efficiency of both markets, which has been validated by the simulation results. The proposed EPEC model can be converted into its single-level MILP equivalence, which is readily to solve, yet brings large numbers of Big-M constraints and binary variables, thus increasing the computational burden of large-scale cases.
Therefore, several modeling simplification techniques are developed to strike a balance between the computational efficiency and the modeling accuracy, among which neglecting the ramping constraints of the gas-fired units is the most useful way according to the simulation results. Three promising aspects serving as our future research interests could facilitate the application of the proposed market framework, which are listed as below.
1) More accurate modeling of the gas systems. A computational tractable formulation of the linepack should be considered. 2) More efficient algorithms for the EPEC model. Particularly, a more accurate reformulation of the complementary slackness conditions needs to be developed. 3) More practical market structures. Such as, one strategic producer may offer energy to both electricity and gas markets.
APPNDIX
For SEP s * , multiplying both sides of (30)- (32) 
Substitute (82) 
By substituting (86) into (85), we obtain the linear expression of (i∈φ i (n p ))bt β n p t P s * ibt as shown in (77). 
